Kentucky Law Journal
Volume 61

Issue 1

Article 15

1972

The Financially Irresponsible Home Builder: A Challenge to Builder
Liability Law
J. David Rosenberg
University of Kentucky

Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj
Part of the Construction Law Commons

Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits you.
Recommended Citation
Rosenberg, J. David (1972) "The Financially Irresponsible Home Builder: A Challenge to Builder Liability
Law," Kentucky Law Journal: Vol. 61: Iss. 1, Article 15.
Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj/vol61/iss1/15

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Kentucky Law Journal by an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For more information,
please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.

1972]

1CoMn4Nrs

THE FINANCIALLY IRRESPONSIBLE HOME BUILDER:
A CHALLENGE TO BUILDER LIABILITY LAW
The most important purchase made by most American families is
their home. It represents their most expensive purchase, as well as
their most permanent one; it provides shelter and recreation; it
delineates social class, and determines friends and associates for parents
and children alike; it is a type of forced savings for the family, and
its appreciation in value makes the home an investment providing a
hedge against inflation.
But the recently realized dreams of home buyers can easily turn
to nightmares filled with frustration, pain, or financial loss. Only
when his infant child is scalded with water from the bathroom sink
does the resident realize the builder's negligence in not installing a
mixing valve.' Defective installation of the water heater may result
in an explosion demolishing the new home. 2 The new house may be
damaged by fire caused by an improperly constructed fireplace and
chimney.3 Or the new homeowner may be pestered by numerous
irritations such as malfunctioning bathroom plumbing, water leakage
in the basement and roof, and unsatisfactory kitchen cabinets. 4 Or.

..-

These situations are taken from the burgeoning group of suits
against home builders. They pose three basic questions for the
unfortunate home buyer and his attorney:
1. Is the home builder legally responsible for the injuries and
damages resulting from his defective construction?
2. Assuming an affirmative answer to the question of the builder's
legal liability, is he financially capable of answering a judgment?
3. Naturally flowing from the first two questions is a third question: if the builder is legally responsible but financially insolvent, to whom can (should) the buyer look for relief?
Obviously, each of these questions raises many subsidiary issues of
legal theory and proof. This comment does not attempt to dissect this
growing area of law. Instead it focuses on the dichotomy between

the home builder's legal and financial responsibility. First, an overview
of the home builder's legal liability is presented. This is followed by
examination of the home building industry, emphasizing the problem
I Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 207 A.2d 314 (N.J. 1965).
2 State Stove Mfg. Co. v. Hodges, 189 So.2d 113 (Miss. 1966), cert. denied,
386 U.S.
912 (1967).
3
Humber v. Morton, 426 S.W.2d 554 (Tex. 1968), noted in 1 TEXAS TECH. L.
REv. 111 (1969).
4 Weak v. A:M Sunrise Constr. Co., 184 N.E.2d 728 (IM. App. 1962).
5 For a dramatic interpretation of four recent cases which prompted suits
against home builders see Young & Harper, Quaere: Caveat Emptor or Caveat
Venditor?, 24 ARK. L. REv. 245, 246-47 (1970).
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of the builder-developer's financial inability to answer judgments
against him. Lastly, suggestions are made for alternate paths to be
followed if the home buyer is to be protected.
I.
Traditionally, homes were custom built for individuals on land
already owned or recently purchased by the prospective homeowner.
The contractor was carefully selected, based upon his reputation in
the community, as a builder of ability and a businessman of fair dealings. A building contract determined the legal relationship between
the builder and the homeowner. The latter had ample means to
protect himself from a defective product. In addition to selecting the
builder based on reputation, an expert could be retained to periodically
check the soundness of the house during its construction, the owner
himself could carefully observe the erection of his home, payments
to the builder could be withheld, and legal action predicated upon
the contract could be taken. 6
Although the custom home builder has not disappeared, he has
been joined in the market by the builder-vendor, also known as the
housing merchant, the merchant builder, or the builder-developer.
The builder-vendor represents a market response to the demand for
housing following World War II. No longer does he build a custom
home for the landowner. Instead, be purchases separate lots or entire
tracts of land which he subdivides into lots. He builds on these lots in
hopes of selling the complete package (house and lot) for a profit.7
Purchasing a new house from a builder-vendor differs considerably
from contracting with a builder to construct a home. Unlike the
products passing over the merchant's counter," the purchase of real
property does not convey an implied warranty of merchantibility and
fitness for a particular purpose.9 Historically, the law shielded the
builder-vendor from liability for his defective construction with two
doctrines: caveat emptor and merger of a real estate sales contract
with the deed conveying the property.
Caveat emptor (let the buyer beware), puts the buyer on guard,
alerting him to carefully inspect all merchandise before purchasing it,
as the seller will bear no responsibility once the transaction is con6 Roberts, The Case of the Unwary Home Buyer: The Housing Merchant Did

It, 52

Con EL_

L.Q. 835, 837 (1967).

See generally L.

GREBLER, PRODUCTON OF

NEw HousINr (1950).
7Id.
8
UNoIFR

CoMmNncs.R
CODE §§ 2-314, 2-315; UNoRm SALF-s Acr §§ 13-16.
9 Bearman, Caveat Emptor in Sales of Realty-Recent Assaults Upon the Rule,
14 VAND. L. Rnv. 541, 541-42 (1961); Haskell, The Case for an Implied Warranty
of Quality in Sales of Real Property, 53 GEo. L.J. 633 (1965).
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summated. The legacy of an age when buyer and seller stood in
roughly equal bargaining positions and shared equal knowledge of
the items being purchased, caveat emptor traditionally has protected
the builder-vendor. 10 Reenforcing the doctrine of caveat emptor has
been the property law concept of merger. Under this doctrine all
preliminary negotiations, including the antecedent contract for purchase of the house, are merged in the deed conveying the land to the
buyer. Following its acceptance, the deed (and not the contract)
contains the entire rights of the parties, and all contractual duties of
the seller except as embodied in the deed are discharged.'1 Deeds
usually contain language transferring the land and warranties and
limitations on the use and enjoyment of the land. The house may be
mentioned, but the deed has traditionally been an instrument conveying land, buildings being treated as incidental. Although the primary
purpose of the transaction is the purchase of a suitable dwelling, the
transfer of land being incidental thereto, the deed functions as though
the opposite were true. Thus, the doctrine of merger often has
frustrated actions against sellers of homes when the buyer's theory
for recovery rested on the contract for sale of the dwelling. 2 Professor
Williston frequently is cited to support these twin defenses. 13
The doctrine of caveat emptor, so far as the title of personal
property is concerned, is very nearly abolished, but in the law of
real property it is still in full force ....
Still more clearly there
can be no warranty of quality of condition implied in the sale of
real estate....
It is generally true also that any express agreements in regard
to land contained in a contract to sell it are merged in the deed if
14
the purchaser accepts a conveyance.
In an age of increasing consumer awareness, when evermore
responsibilities are being placed upon product manufacturers and
merchants, it is only natural for aggrieved home buyers to attack the
historical immunity of the home builder.15 These attacks have not
been uniformly successful as many jurisdictions still absolve the
builder of all responsibility for his house once it is deeded to the
10 For the classic examination of the caveat emptor doctrine see generally
Hamilton, The Ancient Maxim Caveat Emptor, 40 YALE L.J. 1183 (1931). See also
Roberts, supra note 6; Comment, 10 Am. L. l1Ev. 484 (1968).
11 Levy v. C. Young Constr. Co., 134 A.2d 717 (NJ. Super. 1957), aff'd on
other grounds, 139 A.2d 738 (N.J. 1958).
12 Roberts, supra note 6, at 857-62.
13 Cochran v. Keeton 252 So.2d 307, 310 (Ala. Ct. Civ. App. 1970), aff'd,
252 So.2d 313 (Ala. 19715.
144 S. W.LLSON, CONTRACS § 926 (Rev. ed. 1936). But Cf. W. JAEGER, 7
WILLISTON ON CoNrTRCs § 926A (3d ed. 1963).
15 See generally Bearman, supra note 9, at 542-48. See also notes 16-23 infra.
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buyer. However, various legal doctrines holding the builder-vendor
accountable for his product recently have been recognized.' 6
Builder-vendors have been sued successfully in tort under theories
of negligence 7 and strict liability.'" Their negligent construction
causing an imminently dangerous condition, 19 and their failure to disclose a defective condition" have been found to create liability.
Similarly, they have been held responsible for latent defects in the
21
house.

In addition to actions in tort, doctrines predicating liability upon
warranty principles have been recognized. The theory that sale of a
new house gives rise to an implied warranty is increasingly being
adopted by the courts.22 In Louisiana, where the seller is required by
statute to warrant the thing which he sells, 23 a number of cases have

held the builder-vendor or the vendor of a new house liable for defects
existing at the time of the sale. 24 Theories of express warranty also
have brought recovery to home buyers in actions against builder25
vendors.
Where the builder in an action predicated on the sales contract
raised the defense of merger, it, too, was penetrated. Unperformed
16 See generally Cochran v. Keeton, 252 So.2d 307, 311 (Ala. Ct. Civ. App.
1970), aff'd 252 So.2d 313 (Ala. 1971); Annot. 25 A.L.R.3d 383 (1969).
17 E.g., Conolley v. Bull, 258 Cal. App.2d 183, 65 Cal. Rptr. 689 (1968);
Mitchem v. Johnson, 218 N.E.2d 594 (Ohio 1966).
18 See generally Bearman, supra note 9, at 566-70; Comment, 48 Orx. L. REV.
411 (1969). Strict liability in tort is based on the following (famous) chain of
cases: MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916);
Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 214 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944); Heningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960); Greenman v. Yuba Power
Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897 (1962). Its application to real
property is recent and easily traced through these cases: Miller v. Cannon Hills
Estates, Ltd., 2 K.B. 113 (1931); Vanderschrier v. Aaron, 140 N.E.2d 819 (Ohio
1957); Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 207 A.2d 314, 325 (N.J. 1965) (wherein
the court said the distinctions between the manufacture of products and the construction of homes make "no sense in today's society and tend to discredit the law.
.. "); State Stove Mfg. Co. v. Hodges, 189 So.2d 113 (Miss. 1966), noted in 28
Osno S.L.J. 343 (1967).
19 Although the builder defended successfully on the facts, an excellent discussion of this doctrine is presented in Shannon v. Butler Homes, Inc., 428 P.2d
990 (Ariz.
1967). See also, Lowe v. Francis Constr. Co., 373 P.2d 51 (Okla. 1962).
20
E.g., Rogers v. Scyphers, 161 S.E.2d 81 (S.C. 1968); Belote v. Memphis
Dev. Co., 346 S.W.2d 441 (Sup. Ct. of Tenn. 1961), affd, 369 S.W.2d 97 (Tenn.
1962).
21 E.g., Mincy v. Crisler, 96 So. 162 (Miss. 1923); Oremus v. Wynhoff, 123
N.W.2d
22 441 (Wis. 1963).
E.g., Crawley v. Terhune, 437 S.W.2d 743 (Ky. 1969), noted in 58 Ky. L.J.
606 (1970); House v. Thornton, 457 P.2d 199 (Wash. 1969), noted in 45 WAsH.
L. REv. 670 (1970). See also Bearman, supra note 9, at 543-47; Haskell, supra
note 9; Roberts, supra note 6, at 837-43.
23 LA. Crv. CODE ANN. arts. 2520-48 (West 1952).
24
E.g., Sherbcow v. Peres, 64 So.2d 195 (La. 1953); Rodriguez v. Hudson,
79 So.2d 579 (La. App. 1955).
25 Bearman, supra note 9, at 548-49.
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or defectively performed covenants have been held to be collateral
covenants not extinguished by passing of title in the deed.26 Other
courts have found that the parties did not intend acceptance of the
on
deed to represent full performance of the contract; hence, actions
27
the sales contract were allowed after the deed was accepted.
Clearly, the law is far from settled in this area. 8 Nonetheless, this
comment goes no further in listing or examining the legal liability of
the builder. It is a problem amply examined in many recent cases,
and it has been a favorite topic for microscopic examination in
scholarly journals. 29 In affirming a 1970 builder-vendor liability case
arising in Alabama, Justice Maddox of the Supreme Court of Alabama
listed no less than ten recent law review articles and an equal number
of cases. This followed the court's statement that "considerable comment has been made by legal scholars about the new trend toward
judicial abolition of the doctrine of caveat emptor in real estate
sales."30 Repetitious treatment of the issue here would serve no
purpose. Suffice it to leave the subject of the builder's legal liability
with the knowledge that the buyer's attorney now has an arsenal of
recognized arguments for shifting liability from the home purchaser
onto the builder-vendor.
II.
The numerous cases and articles advocating expanding builder
liability all share a common underlying theme: losses arising from
defective construction should not be left for the home buyer to bear.
But developing legal doctrine to shift the loss away from the homeowner and onto the builder is not sufficient to achieve this goal. If
the builder is judgment-proof, the homeowner's position is improved
little.A' The California Court of Appeals succinctly stated the prob26Brownell v. Quin, 197 N.E.2d 721 (Ill. App. 1964); Week v. A:M Sunrise
Constr. Co., 184 N.E.2d 728 (Ill. App. 1962); Lipson v. Southgate Park Corp., 189
N.E.2d
27 191 (Mass. 1963).
1Rapp v. Murray, 171 N.E.2d 374 (Ohio 1960).
28
WILLISTON, supra note 14; Bearman, supranote 9, at 572-73; Roberts, supra

note 26,9 at 837.

Haskell, supra note 9; Comment, 10 Amz. L. Rxv.
supra note 9;•Bearman,
484 (1968); Roberts, supra note 6- Young & Harper, supra.note 5; Note, The Doctrine of Caveat Emptor as Applie to Both the Leasing and Sale of Real Property;

Note, The Need for Reappraisaland Ref ormn, 2 RuTGERS, CAMDEN L.J. 120 (1970);
Note, Builder-Vendor's Implied Warranty of Good Workmanship and Habitability,
1 TE . TECH. L. REv. 111 (1969); Comment, Implied Warranty of Fitness and
Suitability for Human Habitation as Applied to the Sales of New Homes in Texas,
6 HousT. L. REv. 176 (1968); Comment, Implied Warranty in Sales of New
House by Vendor, 58 Ky. L.J. 606 (1970); Comment, Vendor and Purchaser-Im45 WAst. L. REv. _11 (1969).
plied3 Warranty,
0
Cochran v. Keeton, 252 So.2d 313, 314-15 (Ala. 1971).
3
l Roberts, supranote 6, at 868.
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lem: "Woe betide the purchaser who relies, through ignorance or
innocence upon the skill of a developer of less substance and renown
than Levitt & Sons." 32 Yet, for a multiplicity of reasons, the housing
industry is composed primarily of many small and undercapitalized
firms who are incapable of paying a substantial judgment against
them.33 The President's Committee on Urban Housing explains this
unique feature of the housing business:
The smallness of these firms results primarily from the industry's
localized and fragmented nature. There are, however, additional
reasons for the smallness and light capitalization of construction
firms. The rate of housing production is rather erratic, both on a
national basis, and especially in each local market. The main
causes of this instability are seasonal fluctuations in production,
...
the sensitivity of the industry to the supply of credit, and the
dominance of the existing stock [of housing] ....

The erratic rate

of output forces construction firms to try to keep their continuing
2 4
overhead to a minimum, thus discouraging capital investment.
The volatility of the business is evidenced by the high rate of entry
and exit of firms. 35 This rate of firm turnover further indicates that
many home building enterprises operate at the margin of economic
survival. More testimony to the weakness of home building firms
comes from the 1964 National Association of Homebuilders' survey
showing that 60%o of its members had less than four full-time employees, and only 1.4% have fifty or more employees.2 6
The inescapable conclusion derived from a cursory review of the
home building industry is that its members are not uniformly capable
of accepting substantial, unexpected financial losses. Although statiscal evidence is unavailable, it is not improbable that a high correlation exists between the financially irresponsible firm and the
producer of defective housing. Even assuming that sloppy construction is randomly distributed throughout the industry (wvithout regard
to a builder's financial resources), in a field made up of many undercapitalized, small firms, operating close to the margin of economic
survival, it is inevitable that numerous defective homes will be con32 Connor v. Conejo Valley Dev. Co., 61 Cal. Rptr. 333, 345 (Dist. Ct. App.
1967), aff'd, Connor v. Great W. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 73 Cal. Rptr. 369, 447
P.2d 609 (1968).
33See generally, M. EVANs, MACnOcoNolinc Acrmvrr-THEoRY, ForEcAsrInG, AND CONTMOL, AN EcoNomm-izc APPROAcH 184-98 (1969); R. MurE, Crrms
ANDHousing
(1969); Lefcoe & Dobson, Savings Associations as Land Developers,
75 YALE L.J. 1271, 1271-82 (1966).
34Tsn REPORT OF THE PnESnNT's CommriTEE ON URBAx HousiNc, A DECENT Hokum 117 (1968).
35 Id. at 151.
26 Id.
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structed and sold by firms that are judgment-proof. Thus emerge the
twin obstacles frustrating a home buyer's effort to secure redress for
loss from defects in his home-legal liability and economic responsibility both must be shifted.37 The recent emphasis upon legal loss
shifting is essential to solving this twofold problem. But only when
liability in law attaches to a party financially capable of bearing this
responsibility is the real loss shifted. To think38 otherwise is to ignore
the economic realities of the housing industry.
III.
The remainder of this comment examines potential means for
resolving the paradox between legal and financial responsibility of the
builder-vendor. Of course, those jurisdictions still following the rule
of caveat emptor have no problem for the loss remains with the home
purchaser. However, in jurisdictions where the courts have adopted
some form of builder liability, the problem of judgment-proof defendants must be faced. Otherwise, the courts' decisions to protect
home buyers effectively may be frustrated.
Because recognition of builder liability for defective homes is
itself a recent and still incomplete development in the law, there is
little experience with which to predict the course to be followed in
eliminating uncollectable judgments against home builders. This will
come very slowly because the buyer-plaintiff will be reluctant to
institute an expensive legal action against a builder unless confident
that the builder is capable of answering the judgment, and the
financially sound builder often may voluntarily settle with the buyer.
The resulting silence of the wronged buyer only serves to obscure the
problem of uncollectable judgments from judical and legislative
scrutiny. Creativity and imagination of attorneys, judges, and legislators, as well as members of the building industry, will be required to
resolve the problem. The following paragraphs suggest some areas
for exploration.
A. Initial impetus for overcoming judgment-proof defendants
probably will come from attorneys seeking "deep-pocketed defendants"
beyond the insolvent builder. Depending on the particular circumstances, the following parties could be looked to for relief: subcontractors 9 (plumbing, heating, electrical, etc.), suppliers of equipment
37 "[T]he issue of how courts should protect homebuyers is best answered not
by focusing on the consumer's problems alone, but by considering as well the
entire operation and structure of the industry-the total land development context."
LAND D~vEopmlNr LAW vii (1966).
9 G. 3LEFcoE,
8
Connor v. Great W. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 73 Cal. Rptr. 369, 447 P.2d 609
(1968).
89 Lowe v. Francis Constr. Co., 373 P.2d 51 (Okla. 1962).
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and material, architects 40 and engineers, lenders of mortgage and
construction funds, 41 or virtually any party involved in the construction and sale of the house. Merely increasing the number of parties
being sued will not insure that liability will be shifted to one capable
of answering the judgment. This requires the lawyer's sdll in establishing a duty or other legally sufficient relationship between the
buyer and one of the parties who helped build or develop the house.
This writer does not advocate a "shotgun action" against everyone
who "touched" the defective house. But a penetrating examination of
the particular defect and its cause may direct responsibility to someone in addition to the judgment-proof builder. An excellent illustration of this means of recovery, which may well serve as an example to
other jurisdictions, comes from California in the case of Connor v.Great
Western Savings & Loan Association.4- After considering the nature
of the home building industry, its dependence on institutional financing, and the relation of the institutional lender to the home buyer, the
Supreme Court of California reversed a judgment of nonsuit for the
defendant institutional lender in an action by home buyers against
various parties involved in the development and sale of their houses.
Defendant, Great Western Savings & Loan Association, had provided
extensive short-term financing to the builder-developers as well as
mortgages to the eventual buyers, a practice frequently followed in
the home financing business. 43 The court found that Great Western
was neither a joint venturer with Conejo Valley Development Co.,
the builder-developer, 44 nor was Great Western in privity of contract
with any of the plaintiffs except as a lender.45 Nonetheless, the court
held a duty was owed by Great Western to the home buyers, the
breach of which rendered Great Western negligent. Writing for the
majority, Justice Traynor found that "Great Western was clearly under
a duty to the buyers of the homes to exercise reasonable care to protect them from damages caused by major structural defects." 40
40

E.g., Inman v. Binghampton Housing Authority, 3 N.Y.2d 137, 143 N.E.2d
895 (1957). See generally Bell, Professional Negligence of Architects and Engineers, 12 VAND. L. REv. 711 (1959); Witherspoon, When is an Architect Liable?
32 Miss. L.J. 40 (1960); Comment, Architect Tort Liability in Preparationof Plans
and Specifications, 55 CAL. L. Rxv. 1361 (1967).
41 Connor v. Great W. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 73 Cal. Rptr. 369, 447 P.2d 609
(1968), noted in 56 CEo. L.J. 788 (1968) and 44 N.Y.U.L. REv. 689 (1969);
Comment, Liability of the Institutional Lender for Structural Defects in New Housing, 35 U. Cm. L. BEv. 739 (1968).
4273 Cal. Rptr. 369, 447 P.2d 609 (1968).
43 S. MAISEL, FINANICING REAL ESTATE 321 (1965).

4473 Cal. Rptr. at 376, 447 P.2d at 616 (1968).
45 Id. at 377, 447 P.2d at 617 (1968).
46 Id.
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Argument can be made for making the institutional lender responsible always (directly or as a surety) to the home purchaser for
construction defects. 47 This comment neither endorses nor rejects
such recommendations and predictions. Connor is included here to
illustrate the broader range of alternatives for circumventing judgmentproof defendants: the method of looking for "deep-pocketed" parties
who can be joined with the defendant builder. The point to be made
is that the attorney must not be myopic in looking for a financially
sound party, as what appears to be only a tenuous relationship
between the joined party and the home purchaser may be determined
judically to be a legal relationship sufficient to impose liability. This
is especially important where an examination of the special nature
of the home construction industry is included with consideration of
the particular facts of any one case. 48 Connor, then, stands as the
classic example of a wronged home buyer securing relief by looking
beyond the insolvent builder to another party also responsible for the
defect.
B. An alternate and more certain means for eliminating judgmentproof builder-vendors involves action within the legislature instead of
the courtroom. A carefully drawn act requiring some form of minimum
financial reserves, insurance, or bonding of the builder-vendor as a
prerequisite to the sale of homes would protect the home buyer if he
should later secure a judgment against the seller. Such an act could
be drawn in a number of ways.49 The legislature could provide that
deeds on new homes would not be recorded for transfer unless accompanied by evidence of the necessary bond or insurance. Or the act
could require evidence of the bond or insurance as a prerequisite for
a home mortgage by an institutional lender. The lender making a
loan where no such protection was present would be made a surety
for the builder should he later be unable to meet a judgment against
him.
However, the legislative remedy is not without weaknesses. The
cost of required bonding or insurance will be passed on to the home
buyer, thus raising the cost of housing. Depending upon the type of
47 See

the law review articles, supra note 41.
District Court of Appeals which decided Connor recognized the
financial realities of the construction business saying "We merely acknowledge
therein the obligation which must ultimately be assumed by the participant best
able to bear the financial risk ... 61 Cal. Rptr at 347.
49 The New York Law Revision Commission has suggested that "housing
merchants should not be entitled to specific performance of sales contracts unless
they tender along with the deed a bond equal to the sale price of the house and
conditioned upon failure to answer judgment obtained under the new system" of
liability for defective home construction. Roberts, supra note 6 at 868.
48 The
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insurance or bond required, the additional cost to the home buyer
might be spread over the entire term of his mortgage, or it might
require additional cash at the time of purchase. The ease or difficulty
of rating various builders or their construction work would also be
affected by the type of bond or insurance required. Small, new, or
unknown builders may find difficulty securing the necessary financial
protection, thus giving rise to a trend toward oligopoly in a local
market.50 Though by no means complete, these considerations suggest
the need for extensive evaluation of all the potential effects of legislation requiring insurance or bonding of builder-vendors to protect home
buyers.
C. In addition to the legislative and judical treatment of the judgment-proof builder problem, a third alternative exists: the home buyer
can protect himself before consummating purchase of a home. This
requires that he either assure himself of the structural soundness of
the home or the financial strength of the builder-vendor, or that he
arrange for the necessary insurance and negotiate the price of the
home accordingly. Because examination of both the home's structural
soundness and the builder's financial strength may be nearly impossible,rli the purchaser would be well advised to voluntarily secure, or
require that the builder secure, insurance or a bond to protect against
an unanswered judgment.
It is possible that insurance or bonding would become a generally
accepted practice associated with the purchase of a house. An analogous situation has developed in many parts of the country where
title insurance regularly is secured in conjunction with the purchase of
real estate. Lest this approach be given too much importance, it should
be understood that many home buyers, although advised to secure
such insurance, may decide not to do so. But even if the buyer's
preference is not to secure such protection, if it is readily and economically available, mortgage lenders might choose to require it
before issuing a home loan.52 Their motivation would be fear of
potential liability based on the decision in Connor or other similar
cases, or a desire to insure the realty that secures their loan. Thus, the
5

o Roberts, supra note 6, at 870.

51 The buyer usually is not sufficiently expert in construction evaluation to

adequately protect himself. Furthermore, hiring an expert would be difficult and
expensive as most architects would not want to accept responsibility for examining
a completed structure. Many important points such as foundations, wiring, etc.
are hidden in a completed home; therefore defects could not be detected even if
an expert were retained. Bearman, supra note 9, at 545 n.15; Young & Harper,
supra52note 5, at 248.
Comment, 44 N.Y.U. L. Rv. 689, 648 (1969).

1972]

CoMn.rrNs

bond and insurance alternative may develop without legislative action,
as a market response to a demand for consumer or lender protection.
RECAPrrULATION

The law regulating the liability of a builder-vendor to the purchaser
of a home is changing. The builder long has been protected by the
doctrines of caveat emptor and merger of the sales contract with the
deed. Recently, however, these historical defenses often have proved
insufficient as many jurisdictions are recognizing doctrines calling for
protection of the unwary home buyer from defectively constructed
houses. This shift of responsibility onto the builder in order to protect
the home buyer assumes the concomitant financial ability of the
builder-vendor to answer any judgments entered against him. But the
nature of the building industry perpetuates the existence of many
judgment-proof builders. Juxtaposing builders' probable legal liability
with their probable financial capability emphasizes this dichotomy.
Three directions in which the law may develop to protect the home
buyer have been suggested:
A. A solution may be sought in the courtroom through a search
for other parties who may be joined as defendants when the
builder-vendor appears insolvent.
B. The legislature may resolve the problem by requiring minimum
financial reserves, bonding, or insurance of the builder.
C. Home buyers may protect themselves through voluntarily
securing insurance against defective construction and a judgment-proof defendant.
These alternatives are not proposed as absolute solutions. But, they
suggest the paths which may be taken and the obstacles which must
be overcome if innocent home purchasers are to be protected from
uncompensated losses.
I. David Rosenberg

